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Article 8

Confronting The Consolidation Conundrum
Richard L. arc us*

"Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to
leave the court."
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice.
'You are," said the King.
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen.
'Well, I shan't go, at any rate," said Alice; 'besides, that's
not a regular rule; you've invented it just now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.'

Perhaps Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-dealing with consolidation of cases and severance
of issues for trialshould be number one. At least it has
become considerably more important in recent years as courts
have increasingly sought to use the power to consolidate and
sever to design cures for the stresses of modern multiple
l i t i g a t i ~ n .There
~
can be no doubt that the American Law
Institute's Complex Litigation Project has thrust consolidation

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
was a member of the Members' Consultative Group of the American Law Institute
that commented on the ALI Complex Litigation Project. I was also Associate
Reporter to the Federal Courts Study Committee, whose recommendations
regarding consolidation are discussed in this Article. See infra text accompanying
notes 88-89. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone. I would like to
thank Ed Brunet, Mary Kay Kane, Tom Rowe and Joan Steinman who read a
draft of this Article and offered comments. I am indebted for research assistance to
Sarah Colby and Hasan Shafiqullah, members of the Hastings class of 1997.
1. LEWIS CARROLL,ALICE IN WONDERLAND
132 (1986).
2. "Due largely to caseload pressures, the federal courts are consolidating
increasing numbers of cases . . . ." Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case
Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They
Might Be, Part I: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA
L. REV. 717, 718 (1995). Unfortunately, exact figures are not available. "[Tlhe
Administrative Office of the United States Courts has not gathered statistics on
the number of cases consolidated pursuant to [Rule 421." Id. a t 718 n.1.
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center stage. Although it canvassed a variety of procedural
devices for dealing with the challenges of complex litigation,
including party joinder under Rules 19 and 20,~intervention
pursuant to Rule 24: class actions: interpleader: and
bankruptcy,? the Project's principal thrust was to remove
obstacles to consolidation.
For the ALI Project, consolidation is Rule 1, although it is
hard to predict the impact of the Project's proposals on the law.
The Project has already been criticized by academics for trying
to do too much and for failing to do enough. One professor has
lambasted it because it "fails to deal in a holistic fashion with
the interrelated consequences of complex cases," thus leaving
too much ~ n d o n e .Another
~
reacts that the framers of the
Project sought to "use the occasion of complex litigation reform
to overhaul as much of the law of American civil procedure as
possible," and describes a number of the Project's proposals as
"sweeping7'and "radi~al."~
Under these circumstances, the prospects for quick
adoption by Congress of the Project's statutory proposals
appear small. Indeed, much less ambitious statutory initiatives
have been introduced in Congress, but have not been
adopted.'' Logically, if not politically, a central concern for
Congress should be the Project's treatment of consolidation;
unless consolidation is suited to the task of harnessing complex
litigation, there would seem to be little reason to embrace other
procedural reforms-be
they aggressive or incomplete-to
increase opportunities for consolidation.

3. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS24-26 (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION

PROPOSAL].
4. See id. a t 26-27.
5. See id. a t 27-34.
6. See id. a t 34-35.
7. See id. a t 35-36.
8. Linda S. Mullinex, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project
Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977, 979 (1994).
9. Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54
LA. L. REV. 1139, 1143-44 (1994).
10. See H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988); H.R. 3152, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 4315, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986); H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). H.R. 3406 passed the House
of Representatives without opposition, but the Senate did not act on it. For a
review of the legislative process of these proposals, including analysis of the fate of
H.R. 3406 and attention to the role of academic commentary, see Charles G. Geyh,
Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV. LITIG. 401 (1991).

THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM
This Article therefore focuses on consolidation itself,
emphasizing the use of consolidation for combined disposition,
which is a principal objective of the Project." The Article builds
on Professor Steinman's recent and very substantial work on
the implications of consolidation and examines the standards
and methods for deciding whether cases should be consolidated,
a topic which she did not address.12 As Professor Steinman's
work has revealed, consolidation presents a conundrum which
surfaces in a number of jurisdictional and jurisdiction-related
procedural puzzles. Whether consolidation should be employed
in complex litigation seems the central question, but it has
been little examined in the literature. The Complex Litigation
Project provides a careful examination of the propriety and
methods of consolidation. Evaluating the adequacy of this
treatment thus provides the means through which this Article

11. Consolidation pursuant to Rule 42 can be solely for pretrial purposes and,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1407 (1988), transfer and consolidation are supposed to be
limited to such purposes. The reality, however, is that consolidation that is initially
designated "pretrial" is often never unscrambled because there is a global
settlement, because the consolidated cases are resolved by pretrial motion, or
because the cases are later formally consolidated for trial. For a thorough
exploration of these realities and their ramifications, see Steinman, supra note 2.
Whatever the present reality, it is evident that the thrust of the ALI Project is
to facilitate consolidation for disposition of the actions, whether by settlement,
pretrial ruling, or trial. A by-product of this effort may be severance of cases into
constituent parts, such as liability and damages, and resolution of only some issues
on a consolidated basis. See infra text accompanying notes 68-83, 177-206. But that
does not change the basic thrust toward consolidated resolution. Some are quite
overt about this objective:
As somebody who has been involved in these mass torts over the last
twelve years on a regular basis, I want to make an additional point.
What is the single most important feature of these mass torts in terms of
getting them resolved? What ultimate issue holds the key to the
resolution of these claims in an efficient way? The answer is aggregation.
Aggregation. You must get all of the cases in one forum. Until you do
that, any piecemeal solution, however beneficial it may be, does not offer
either the plaintiff or the defendant global peace.
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass
Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEX.L. REV. 1647, 1648 (1995).
Consolidation for trial or other resolution is therefore the focus of this Article.
Accordingly, the cautions about consolidation in this Article may not apply to
coordinating discovery to avoid duplication of effort.
12. See Steinman, supra note 2, a t 720 & n.10; see also Joan Steinman, The
Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are,
What They Might Be, Part I t Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42 UCLA L. REV. 967
(1995).
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will address the question whether consolidation should be used
in complex litigation.
To put the question in context, the Article begins in Part I1
with a review of the evolution of consolidation, stressing its
increasing importance. Part I11 identifies the sometimes
troubling implications consolidation has for the parties and the
court, finding reason for the Federal Courts Study Committee's
1990 call for more detailed guidelines for the use of this
technique. Part N then forms the heart of the analysis by
examining the Project's treatment of consolidation criteria,
concluding that the Project impressively illuminates the issues
but should be fortified by adoption of standards for
consolidation that fully parallel those for common question
class actions. Part IV also evaluates both the Project's reliance
on a newly created Complex Litigation Panel to make the
initial decision whether to consolidate, and its propulsion
toward fragmenting cases by severance. Finally, Part IV
reflects on the questions that will be before Congress should
the Project's proposals be introduced there. The Article then
turns in Part V to brief reflections on ways the Project's
treatment of consolidation could be employed by courts under
current statutory arrangements. It concludes with the hope
that the Project's work on consolidation will be used by courts
even if the proposal's menu of jurisdictional and choice of law
changes fostering consolidation languishes unenacted.

Consolidation has been around for a long time. Introduced
in England in the eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield,13 it
was first authorized in the federal courts in this country by a
statute adopted in 1813.14 According to Professor Meador,

13. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 292 (1892) (explaining
that Lord Mansfield introduced the consolidation rule to "avoid the expense and
delay attending the trial of a multiplicity of actions upon the same question").
14. Act of July 22, 1813 5 3, 3 Stat. ch. 14. The statute provided in pertinent
part:
Whenever causes of like nature, or relative to the same question shall
be pending before a court of the United States or of the territories
thereof, it shall be lawful for the court to make such orders and rules
concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the principles
and usages belonging to courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in
the administration of justice, and accordingly causes may be consolidated
as to the court shall appear reasonable.

THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM
consolidation for trial was "[olne of the earliest examples of
case management based on inherent authority," and it was
viewed in American jurisprudence as "an inseparable aspect of
the powers possessed by common-law and equity ~ourts."'~
Mindful of the risks of comparing joinder attitudes of the
19th century with those of the present,16 one can comfortably
conclude that consolidation initially served largely as an
antidote to strict limitations on joinder that precluded
combination in a single suit even of closely related claims. One
example is the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon," a case familiar to generations of
law students for its rule on hearsay evidence,18which involved
separate suits against three insurance companies based on
separate life insurance policies issued on the life of the same
man.lg Each insurance company denied that the man was dead,
and the trial court consolidated the three cases for trial of that
question even though plaintiff could not have joined all
companies in a single suit under prevailing joinder rules.20
Under current joinder notions, of course, the combination of
these three claims in a single lawsuit would be unexceptional.
Defendants contended on appeal that the combination of the
cases was improper because the actions did not relate to the
same question, but the Court refused to interfere with the trial
judge's conclusion that a combined trial would avoid
unnecessary delay and expense.21 In a 1933 case, the Court
This statute, and its successors, remained on the books until 1948, although
effectively superseded by Rule 42 in 1938. See Gregory R. Harris, Note,
Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 Viewed
in Light of Rule 42(a) and Section 1404(a), 22 HASTINGSL.J. 1289, 1290 n.6
(1971).
15. Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1995).
16. See generally Robert Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute:
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89
COLUM.L. REV. 1 (1989) (cautioning against the assumption that 19th century
proceduralists embraced the same attitude toward joinder as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
17. 145 US. 285 (1892).
18. Hillmon probably appears as a principal case in every American evidence
casebook. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1974, it was so
widely recognized that the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(3) satisfied
themselves with the comment that "[tlhe rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon
allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is,
of course, left undisturbed." FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note.
19. Hillmon, 145 U.S. a t 285-86.
20. Id. a t 286.
21. Id. a t 289-92. The Court went on to reverse the judgment for plaintiff
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added that "consolidation is permitted as a matter of
convenience and economy in admini~tration."~~
Rule 42 carried forward this flexible approach to joinder,
building in part on experience in some state court systems.23
Rule 42 is said to go beyond even the broad initial party joinder
opportunities afforded by Rule 2 0 . The
~ ~ courts, however, have
sometimes been circumspect in taking advantage of Rule 42's
potentially wide scope of omb bin at ion.^^ For some time,

due to the trial judge's limitation on defendant's peremptory challenges, and then
volunteered its answer to the evidence question that has transfixed evidence
scholars by holding that the insurance companies should be allowed to offer letters
written by another man in support of their claim that the dead body that had
been found was really his. The letters indicated that their author intended to
accompany plaintiff's alleged decedent on the trip that allegedly led to his death.
Plaintiff had objected to introduction of these letters on hearsay grounds, but the
Court held that they could nevertheless be admitted to prove that the author acted
a s the letters said he intended to act. Id. a t 295-300.
22. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496 (1933). In Johnson, the
Court said that the consolidation of cases does not "merge the suits into a single
cause." Id. a t 496-97; see also Steinman, supra notes 2 and 12 (discussing these
issues in more detail). The statement caused much uncertainty that remains
unresolved.
In reality, the situation in Johnson was so peculiar that it does not seem to
justify generalization. The problem in Johnson seems to have developed from a
disagreement between Judge Martin Manton of the Second Circuit and the judges
of the Southern District of New York about which trust company to appoint in
receivership situations. Relying on a statute that allowed the senior circuit judge to
assign a judge to serve on a district court, Judge Manton assigned himself to sit
on the district court, had an action involving the Manhattan Railway Co. filed
before him, and promptly appointed a trustee. Johnson later filed a second action,
which was assigned to a district judge in the normal course. The district judge
appointed a different trustee and invalidated Judge Manton's order of appointment,
declaring that he was consolidating the two cases. The Supreme Court held the
district judge's order invalid because the district judge did not acquire authority
over Judge Manton's case by declaring it consolidated with the case the judge was
presiding over. The basic difficulty was thus a problem of case assignment, not
consolidation; had Judge Manton's case been assigned to the district judge he could
have revoked the earlier order whether or not the two cases were consolidated.
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42 advisory committee's notes (stating that the rule's
provisions are comparable to those adopted in Arkansas, California, New Mexico,
and New York).
24. "[Ilt would be a mistake to assume that the standard for consolidation is
the same as that governing the original joinder of parties or claims." 9 CHARLESA.
WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER,FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 5 2382, a t 432
(2d ed. 1994).
25. For example, in Clark v. Elgin, 25 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ohio 1960), four
suits arising from a single auto accident were consolidated, but the court declined
to combine them with a fifth arising out of the same accident because it involved
an issue of contributory negligence. Under Rule 20, joinder of these claims in a
single suit would of course have been permissible since all arose out of the same
occurrence.
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consolidation was only a sporadic event, and not a device the
courts viewed as useful in combating caseload pressures. Thus,
when conferences were convened in the 1950s to examine ways
, ~ substantial
~
consideration
to deal with protracted l i t i g a t i ~ nno
was given to consolidation as such a technique. But the
problem of the repetitious suit was not far off.
By the 1960s consolidation began to play a more prominent
role in some types of cases. Confronted with some 2,000 private
actions nationwide resulting from the electrical equipment
price-fixing conspiracy, Chief Justice Warren appointed an ad
hoc committee of judges to provide consistent treatment of
discovery in these cases. Although not precisely consolidation,
this was a move in that direction. The experience was
sufficiently successful to prompt Congress in 1968 to create the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Congress granted the
panel newly created authority to transfer cases pending in a
variety of federal courts for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
treatment .27
Within a few years, it became widely recognized that even
though this type of transfer was supposed to be limited to
pretrial handling of cases, it usually shifted final responsibility
for the cases to the court presiding over the consolidated
proceedings, in part because transferee judges frequently used
28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) to obtain authority to transfer for all
purposes, including
Widespread use of transfer
provisions thus paved the way for consolidated treatment of
significant numbers of antitrust and securities fraud suits.
It has been in tort litigation, however, that consolidation
has played its most prominent role in recent years. As early as
1963, a prescient student comment focused on the role of

26. See Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States
Circuit and District Judges Held at N.Y.U. Law Center, Aug. 26-30, 1957, 21
F.R.D. 395; Proceedings on the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States
Ju&es Held at Stan. L. Sch., Aug. 25-30, 1958, 23 F.R.D. 319.
27. 28 U.S.C. 8 1407(a).
28. John F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the
Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 588, 589 (1972) ("[Tlransfer for the
limited purpose of pretrial proceedings has become functionally equivalent to
transfer for all purposes, including trial on substantive legal issues."). This does
not mean that transfer for pretrial purposes could not have such effects absent a
later follow-up transfer under 8 1404(a). Section 1407 only requires re-transfer for
trial, and most cases (including those transferred pursuant to !j 1407) don't reach
trial. Thus, many cases would be concluded by settlement or dispositive pretrial
motions after a 8 1407 transfer even without the subsequent 8 1404(a) transfer.
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consolidation in mass tort cases.29 Under the Multidistrict
Litigation Act, transfer and consolidation were often used in
mass disaster cases arising out of airplane crashes and hotel
fires, and these techniques have also become popular in more
dispersed tort cases involving exposure to allegedly toxic
substances. The popularity of transfer and consolidation in
mass tort cases has, in part, been due to the siege mentality
that has gained currency in the judiciary." As judges chafed a t
some of the prerequisites and limitations of class actions in
mass tort
the consolidation avenue became more
a t t r a ~ t i v e .For
~ ~ example, District Judge Robert Parker of
Texas, who had a large docket of asbestos cases, experimented
with both consolidation and class action treatment in handling
this docket. Eventually, as reported by Professor Mullenix, he
became "indifferent as to whether to conduct [his pending
asbestos cases] as a Rule 42 consolidation or as a Rule 23 class
action."33 Probably the most aggressive use of t h e
29. Comment, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 373
(1963).
30. See Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage Awards in Mass-Tort
Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 463, 493 (1991) (referring to "the mass-tort litigation that
has placed the courts under siege").
31. See generally Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort
Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995).
32. Mining the interaction between class actions and consolidations, courts
can use consolidation to capture the claims of class members who opt out of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659
F.2d 1341, 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The district judge . . . was, and perhaps still is,
contemplating consolidation of all the opt-out cases for trial . . . ."); Lailhengue v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 775 F. Supp. 908, 914 n.8 (E.D. La. 1991) ("Any opt-out plaintiffs
would be consolidated with the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
42(a) for trial on punitive damages."); Eastern Brewing Corp. v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 1989 WL 158752 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (class action and four similar actions brought
by opt-out plaintiffs consolidated); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,SECOND,
5 21.631 (1985) ("Class actions may be consolidated with cases instituted by optouts or others.") [hereinafter MANUAL, SECOND];WILLIAMW SCHWARZER,
MANAGING
ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEXLITIGATION183 (1982) ("Individual actions
ancillary to the class action should be managed so as to minimize duplication of
activity. Consolidating them with the main action for pretrial and trial reduces
such duplication of effort.").
LITIGATION,RIIRD, continues to recognize the power
The MANUALFOR COMPLEX
to consolidate the cases of opt-out plaintiffs, but cautions:
Care should be taken in such situations to ensure that counsel for the
parties in the nonclass actions are given a fair opportunity to participate
in the presentation of evidence and arguments a t trial, particularly when
their clients are particularly affected.
MANUALFOR COMPLEXLITIGATION,THIRD, 5 21.631 (1995) [hereinafter MANUAL,

-1.
33. Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in
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consolidation power occurred in 1991, when the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel transferred over 26,000 asbestos personal
injury cases to a single district judge in hopes he could apply "a
new, streamlined approach" to them.34 Recognizing the
increased use of consolidation, Professor Resnik, in her
comprehensive 1991 study of tendencies toward aggregation of
litigation, concluded that "class actions are a visible but
probably not dominant form of aggregati~n."~

Consolidation holds out a bland, somewhat technocratic,
uncontroversial face to the world. Thus, as she worked on her
study of procedural implications of consolidation, Professor
Steinman was struck by the widespread belief of legal
professionals that consolidation would not affect the rights of
litigant^.^^ But courts are beginning to notice that the reality of
consolidation, particularly in mass tort cases, sometimes has
very substantial effects on those rights. As the Second Circuit
cautioned in upholding a consolidation order in 1992, "The
systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to
trump our dedication to individual justice, and we must take
care that each individual plaintiff's-and defendant's-cause

Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 504 (1991); see also
id. a t 489 (reporting that earlier Judge Parker had "believed he had reached the
maximum consolidation feasible" with consolidated trials of 30 plaintiffs).
34. I n re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 418 (J.P.M.L.
1991). The Panel had previously refused to transfer asbestos cases on the ground
that they did not present common questions. In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation
Material Prod. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.L. 1977). In 1991, it explained
that developments since 1977 promoted the difference in outcome: " W e are
persuaded that this litigation has reached a magnitude, not contemplated in the
record before us in 1977, that threatens the administration of justice . . . ." 771 F.
Supp. a t 418. Recognizing the potential drawbacks of consolidation, however, it
assured claimants that the transfer would not "result in their actions entering
some black hole, never to be seen again." Id. a t 423 n.10.
35. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS.,
Summer 1991, a t 5, 22; see also Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and
Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG.495 (1991).
36. As Professor Steinman explains:
Even persons who are well educated in the law and have years of
experience are largely oblivious to the effects of consolidation upon the
procedural rights of litigants. The general belief seems to be that
consolidation does not affect litigants' procedural rights. Invariably, when
I
I told friends-law
professors, practitioners, magistrate judges-what
was writing about, their response was, "Can you give me an example?"
Steinman, supra note 2, at 721 all.
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not be lost in the shadow of a towering mass litigation."?
There is a price to be paid for the bounty of consolidation that
needs to be taken into account.
Recognizing these concerns, the appellate courts have not
allowed district judges carte blanche to consolidate, even in
mass tort cases. In 1993, for example, the Second Circuit
overturned two efforts to consolidate mass tort claims. In one,
it reversed a judgment for plaintiffs that resulted from a
consolidated trial of 600 asbestos cases.38The appellate court
noted the "herculean task" of coping with mass torts and
acknowledged that "[plre-trial consolidation for the purposes of
discovery, the appointment of special masters to expedite the
settlement, and, especially, the liberal use of consolidated trials
have ameliorated what might otherwise be a sclerotic backlog
of cases."39Nevertheless, the court held that consolidation was
an abuse of discretion, reasoning that the varied work histories
of the plaintiffs had presented the jury with a "dizzying
amount" of evidence and that the case was therefore
distinguishable from the 1992 case quoted above, which upheld
the judgment of a consolidated trial of asbestos claims for
workers at a hipy yard.^' One judge dissented, arguing that the
majority's view "would likely compel the post-trial reversal of
most large-scale consolidated trials of product liability claims"
even though "[c]onsolidated trials are an indispensable means
of resolving the thousands of asbestos claims flooding our state
and federal courts, as well as claims arising from other types of
mass torts."41

37. I n re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir.
1992) (citations omitted).
38. Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 348 (2d Cir. 1993).
39. Id. at 350.
40. Id. at 349, 353 (citing In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d
831 (2d Cir. 1992), quoted in text accompanying note 37 supra). In Malcolm, the
Second Circuit said Brooklyn Navy Yard was different due to the similarity of
experience of those workers because the employer there was the military, and
"uniformity is a way of life with the military." Malcolm, 995 F.2d a t 353.
41. Malcolm, 995 F.2d a t 354-55 Walker, J., dissenting).
The Second Circuit is not oblivious to those concerns. Thus, in Consorti v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 64 F.3d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 19951, it emphasized that
"[clonsolidation is a valuable and important tool of judicial administration," and
that "without consolidation the courts are simply incapable of handling of such
volume" as the 200,000 asbestosis cases filed in state and federal courts. The
district judge there had consolidated four separate asbestosis claims for trial, and
defendant appealed from the verdict in favor of one plaintiff on the ground that
Malcom announced a "strong anti-consolidation bias." Citing the &I Project, id. a t
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In another 1993 case, the Second Circuit granted a writ of
mandamus to overturn the consolidation of 44 cases involving
repetitive stress injury (RSI) allegedly caused by various types
of keyboard office equipment.42The court emphasized that this
alleged condition encompasses a wide variety of problems, that
these problems may result from individual-specific conditions
such as obesity and high blood cholesterol levels, and that the
cases involved a wide variety of office equipment (from cash
registers to computers).43 Moreover, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation had earlier refused to consolidate all
RSI cases on the ground that there was not sufficient
commonality." The Second Circuit concluded that "the district
court substituted a discussion of so-called mass torts for precise
findings as to what are the 'common question[s] of law or fact'
justifying consolidation pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42.7'45
These appellate setbacks for consolidation of mass tort
cases emphasize the contemporary importance of consolidation,
and also that consolidation can substantially affect the rights
and interests of parties. Some of the impetus to submerge the
individual features of claims results uniquely from
consolidation, while other tendencies in this direction are only
compounded by it. In any event, it is important to canvass the
sorts of effects consolidation can produce to appreciate
consolidation's i m p o r t a n ~ e . ~ ~

786, the court affirmed. It explained the outcome in Malcom as due to "factors
unique to that case." Id. a t 785. In particular, it turned out a t trial in Malcom
that the district court was wrong in believing that all plaintiffs had spent most of
their work history a t power plant work sites, and there were also serious problems
caused by the addition on the eve of trial of over 200 companies as third-party
defendants. Id. a t 786-87. Because the district judge in the case before it took
pains to distinguish the various consolidated cases for the benefit of the jury, the
court concluded that the combination might have improved the quality of the
decision in the case. Id.
42. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993).
43. Id. a t 371, 373-74.
44. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Prod. Liab. Litig., 1992 W L 403023
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
45. Repetitive Stress Injury, 11 F.3d a t 373 (alteration in original).
46. For a similar examination, see William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial
Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit
Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal
Courts, 73 TEX.L. REV. 1529, 1546-50 (1995).
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A. Loss of Control
Consolidation is not supposed to diminish a party's control
over its case. Professor Moore's treatise thus continues to assure its readers that after consolidation "each party remains
free to control its own case and conduct trial procedure^."^^
But the reality is often otherwise, and even Professor Moore
follows his assurance with a citation to a case that undermines
A principal impetus behind this loss of control
that as~urance:~
is the need to organize and discipline the numerous parties in a
consolidated proceeding. As a New York state court recognized
in 1899:
[Tlhere can be but one master of a litigation on the side of the
plaintiffs. It is also plain that it would be as easy to drive a
span of horses pulling in diverging directions, as to conduct a
litigation by separate, independent action of various plaintiffs,
acting without concert, and with possible dis~ord.'~

To a substantial extent, this loss of control occurs without consolidation when numerous parties are joined in a litigation, and
the loss may be felt by both plaintiffs and defendants."
Courts can and do take actions that magnify loss of control,
however. The most important is appointment of lead counsel,

47. 5 JAMES W. MOORE,MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE ¶ 42.02[5], a t 42-36-37
to 42-37 (2d ed. 1995).
48. Id. at 42-37, citing Farber v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 442 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1971) (refusing to consider a motion for summary judgment filed by nonlead counsel).
49. Manning v. Mercantile Trust Co., 57 N.Y.S.467, 468 (1899).
50. Thus, an experienced antitrust lawyer summarized the situation on the
defense side of antitrust class actions as follows:
Even where the court does not formally appoint liaison counsel or lead
counsel, everything in an antitrust class action is handled by committee
anyway. Those of you who have participated in meetings of counsel in
such cases know that your experience in the courtroom does you precious
little good; what you would need, ideally, is experience in a state legislature. In fact, it is oRen the best trial lawyers who have the hardest time
adapting to what have become the accepted procedures for handling antitrust class actions. A good trial lawyer's tenacious pursuit of his own
theory of the case and his unwillingness to compromise his client's interest in the slightest respect for the good of the majority are almost irnmediately taken as signs of pigheadedness on the part of his fellow counsel.
The result is that he is quickly ostracized from the decision-making inner
circle of lawyers on his side of the case, thereby further diminishing his
ability to influence the course of the proceedings.
Dando Cellini, An Overview of Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1501,
1505 (1980).
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which ordinarily involves circumscribing the latitude of other
lawyers in the case." Courts have upheld orders that forbid
nonlead counsel from filing motions or undertaking discovery
without permission from lead counsel.52Beyond appointment of
lead counsel, the court may direct that the original pleadings
be superseded by a consolidated complaint in order to avoid the
confusion that would result from conducting combined litigation with reference to a large number of pleadings. Such consolidated complaints, typically drafted by a committee of lawyers,
may have an "everything but the kitchen sink" air that disturbs defendants who find themselves confkonting new or expanded charges as a result of the rewriting.53The consolidation
of the complaint can be disturbing to plaintiffs as well, for it
takes control over the content of the complaint away from the
individual ~ l a i m a n t sAlthough
.~~
a court may allow dissenting
plaintiffs to abjure certain claims,55plaintiffs may be compelled

51. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEXLITIGATION,THIRD includes a sample order
designating lead counsel to determine the position of the plaintiffs on all matters
arising in the cases, to coordinate the discovery, to conduct settlement negotiations,
and to delegate responsibilities to other lawyers whom lead counsel is to "monitor."
MANUAL,THIRD,supra note 32, 8 41.31. The MANUAL, SECOND,further urged that
counsel seek accord, but added that if consensus could not be achieved, "and if a
single position need not be taken by all members of the group, members may proceed on that matter individually or by sub-groups." MANUAL, SECOND,supra note
32, 5 20.222 (emphasis added). The MANUAL, THIRD, softens this provision, saying
that if consensus is not achieved "members of the group may have to proceed on
the matter individually or by subgroups." MANUAL, THIRD, supra note 32, 5 20.222.
52. See Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977); see
also supra note 48.
53. See, e.g., Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354, 1361 (2d Cir.
1975) (noting that defendants who were "actors on the periphery" found themselves
potentially facing expanded claims under consolidated complaint); Waldman v.
Electrospace Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281, 284 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that plaintiffs
are more likely to add defendants in consolidated complaint); see also Diana E .
Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation, 132
F.R.D. 597, 598 (1991) ("Despite the procedural label, a decision regarding the use
of a unified or consolidated complaint may well have implications for other aspects
of the case, such as class certification and choice of law questions.").
54. As Judge Murphy noted in her article on consolidated complaints:
Plaintiffs traditionally seek to maintain the maximum degree of control
over their cases, and multidistrict cases produce more than the usual
amount of tension among counsel regarding case management issues. . . .
[A] court order requiring the filing of a unified complaint, even one limited to pretrial proceedings, may be viewed by counsel as an intrusion on
their right to conduct their case as they see fit.
Murphy, supra note 53, a t 601-02. See also Steinman, supra note 12, a t 973-76.
55. See In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 630 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (D.
Colo. 1986).

892

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

to pursue claims they prefer not to assert? Assurances that
the various cases will be unbundled for trial and the original
complaints reinstated5?seem inherently unreliable since discovery, decisions on motions, and other pretrial orders all focus on
the consolidated complaint.
In sum, as others have noted, consolidation can leave
claimants with as little control over their cases as unnamed
class members in a class action.58Of course, the loss of control
may be viewed as a matter of only moderate concern depending
on the size and nature of the claims involved. With personal
injury claims, however, there is a deep tradition of individual
autonomy.59But even in personal injury claims, empirical research suggests that tort claimants often do not have a strong
sense of control over the cases when handled in the normal
manneq6' and opposition to combined treatment may be due
more to the reaction of lawyers than to that of parties?' Indeed, although it seems undeniable that claimants like personal involvement in their cases, it may be that alternatives to
traditional litigation could offer more promise of actual involvement for most claimant^.^^
56. See In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 262, 264-65 (D.
Minn. 1989) (including additional defendants in consolidated complaint over objection of some plaintiffs). But cf. Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that consolidated complaint including law firm as a defendant is inappropriate because all plaintiffs but one disavowed claim against law firm and that one
plaintiff appeared to lack standing to sue firm).
57. In Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975), the district judge said that the use of a consolidated complaint during pretrial "could be
without prejudice to unfurling the separate flags a t trial." Id. a t 1358.
58. See, e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELLL. REV. 779, 816-24 (1985); Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78
IOWAL. REV. 1029, 1042 (1993) ("[Alfter consolidation, the procedural safeguards
that due process and codified rules demand in class actions of similar magnitude
often do not counterbalance the litigant's loss of control."); cf. Silver, supra note 35,
a t 497-98 (arguing that consolidations are unlike class actions because they are not
representational actions, and "[plarties and lawyers who stand a t the head of a
consolidation lead not as a dictator leads a people, but as an explorer leads a
group of settlers into a new land-by going first").
59. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989
U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 70-76.
60. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89.
61. Cf. Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone? 98
F.R.D. 323, 329-30 (1983) (criticizing plaintiff lawyers' opposition to class certification in mass tort cases as self-interested).
62. See Hensler, supra note 60, a t 104 ("Faced with the realities of modern
mass tort litigation, courts-and legal scholar-should
be open to the possibility
that expanding the use of formal aggregative procedures may provide more litigant
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B. The Blending Effect
Combining cases because of their similarities stresses the
factors of similarity and can consequently deflect attention
from features that distinguish cases from one another.63One
symptom of this blending effect is the tendency in multidistrict
proceedings to defer discovery or other action on unique aspects
of cases and instead to focus the consolidated proceedings on
common issues.64Natural and expedient though this may be, it
also bespeaks a shift in emphasis that may prejudice parties on
one side or the other, or both.
From the defendants7perspective, the concern is that individualized grounds of defense may be submerged or obscured
due to preoccupation with common issues. The marginalization
of individual defenses has been a frequent complaint in class
actions, and has sometimes caused courts to rehse to allow
class treatment? But other courts have solved such problems
and facilitated class treatment by streamlining the application
of substantive law t o shave away elements that would require
consideration of individual circumstan~es.~~
Much as there may
be good reason for such refinement in the grounds for liability,

control over the litigation process, more opportunity for litigant participation in the
process, and a better match between victims' losses and compensation in those
TORT
cases."); see also E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTIONOF JUSTICE:
COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION
AND JUDICIAL
SETTLELITIGANTS'VIEWS OF TRIAL,
MENT CONFERENCES
79-80 (1989) (reporting that litigants surveyed preferred arbitration to court-promoted settlements because they felt more involved in the former).
63. "Courts' attempts to manage mass torts efficiently often further increase
the commonality among mass tort claims." Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59
BROOK.L. REV. 961, 967 (1993).
64. See generally DAVIDF. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION$ 9.7.3 a t 204-07
(1986) (focusing on common discovery with special provision for individual issues).
This orientation lies behind the effort to separate the common issues for initial
decision that the Project seeks to promote. See COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 3, 112-16.
65. See, eg., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65-72 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978) (holding that need for individualized proof
of impact and damages doomed antitrust class action).
66. See, eg., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976) (employing fraud on the market theory in a securities fraud
class action to obviate individualized proof of reliance). Related but more difficult
issues arise when state-law claims are within the supplemental jurisdiction of the
court, and the court seeks to blend the provisions of the law of several states, or
to focus on the law of a single state, to facilitate aggregated resolution of cases using a class action or other procedural devices. For discussion of these problems, see
COMPLEXLITIGATION PROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 347-49.
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it seems difficult to deny that a prime impetus for the shift has
been the judicial desire to handle cases in gross.
From the plaintiffs' perspective, the homogenizing effect of
combined litigation is a mixed blessing, depending on the individual circumstances of a given plaintiff. There is already
something of a shift toward the mean in individual litigation
that leaves claimants with the largest and strongest claims
receiving less complete compensation than those with small
claims.67Consolidation may accelerate this tendency, benefitting plaintiffs with weak claims, while harming plaintiffs with
stronger claims.

C. Magnifying the Urge to Sever Issues
Although bifurcation is said to be a "wholly different" procedure fkom cons~lidation,~~
it is not an accident that the two
are combined in Rule 42. A court may find it desirable to separate issues for trial in order to expedite or simplify the resolution of a case between two parties. Indeed, a 1987 survey of
state and federal judges indicated that they "overwhelmingly"
supported bifurcation of issues "in appropriate cases."69 But
even in a case with only two parties, the task of segregating
certain issues for separate trial may prove daunting.?' As Judge
Posner recently put it, a district judge who orders bifurcation
"must carve a t the joint."?' When separate cases are consolidated but still involve unique issues, the urge to consolidate
and to extract the common issues for trial, deferring the others

67. See Hensler, supra note 60, a t 100-03. To a substantial extent this
batching may result from the practices of plaintiffs' counsel. At least in asbestos
personal injury litigation, some plaintiff lawyers carry large "portfolios" of litigation
and some seek what are called "inventory settlements" applying to large numbers
of clients. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchen Prod., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 294 (E.D. Pa.
1994). More generally, in mass tort litigation there have emerged two categories of
attorneys known as the "wholesalers" and the "retailers," indentified by their preference for either individual litigation or group resolution of claims. See RICHARD
SOBOL,BENDINGTHE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY
73
(1991) (describing emergence of two groups of plaintiff lawyers representing women
claiming injury due to Dalkon Shield).
68. 9 WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 24, 8 2381, a t 427.
69. LOUIS HARRIS& ASSOC., INC., JUDGES'
OPINIONSON PROCEDURAL
ISSUES
58-65 (1987) (study NO. 87017).
70. E.g., Symbolic Control, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 643
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing the judgment for the defendant in an antitrust
case because the district court, as a result of its bifurcation order, improperly truncated the causation inquiry).
71. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995).
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for later action, follows rather naturally. That practice may be
troublesome, however, for at least two related reasons.72
The first can be called the sterile trial problem. The paradigm recent example was In re Bendectin Litigati~n,?~
in which
the Sixth Circuit affirmed a defense verdict despite serious
misgivings about the district court's order that the issues be
trifurcated for trial. Owing to transfer by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation and removal from state court, the district court had before it over 800 cases involving claims of over
1,100 plaintiffs for birth defects allegedly resulting from exposure in utero to defendant's antinausea drug. To expedite the
handling of these cases, the district court eventually trifurcated
the issues, leading to an initial trial on the question of whether
the drug is a proximate cause of birth defects.74In addition, the
district judge directed that all visibly deformed plaintiffs be
excluded from the courtroom during the trial. The appellate
court recognized that the judge's order "could possibly prevent
the plaintiffs from exercising their right to present to the jury
the full atmosphere of their cause of action, including the reality of injury,"75and that the severance created the risk that
the trial would have "a sterile or laboratory a t m ~ s p h e r e . "Al~~
though it found this the "most troubling" aspect of the case, the
appellate court affirmed because Rule 42 gives the district
court "'virtually unlimited freedom to try the issues in whatever way trial convenience require^?"^ Moreover, it noted
that individual trial of all these cases could have occupied 182
district judges for a year.78A concurring judge criticized the
district judge's handling of the case, noting that "the typical
procedure in litigation does not involve the splitting up of a
case, element by element, and trying each point to the jury
~ e p a r a t e l y , "but
~ ~ he found no prejudice in this case because
72. For a more detailed examination of the arguments related to issue separation, see James A. Henderson et al., Optimal Issue Separation in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1653, 1675-94 (1995).
73. 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
74. The plaintiffs had consented to be bound by Ohio law, thus eliminating
the possibility that different legal rules would preclude presentation of a single,
common issue.
75. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 315.
76. Id. (quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir.
1982)).
77. Id. at 316 (quoting 9 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE
9 2387, at 278 (1st ed. 1971)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 328 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
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plaintiffs had presented no evidence of any link between the
drug and birth defects?' The Anglo-American tradition has
relied on a complete in-court trial in which the litigant may
participate. As in Bendectin, consolidation and bifurcation may
undermine that tradition. Separation of issues may also truncate the ability of a jury to assess the case.81Thus, the sterile
trial risk raises basic concerns.
The urge to extract common issues also leads to a second
concern-a pro-defendant shift in results. Thirty years ago it
was reported that defendants in personal injury cases won
forty-two percent of those cases in which liability and damages
were tried together, but seventy-nine percent of those in which
liability was tried separately.82 This difference might indicate

Jones explained his concerns with the district judge's order regarding the manner
of trial as follows:
Although each distinct event involved the ingesting of the same drug, it
is hard to believe that all eight hundred plus claims can be tied neatly
into one package and satisfactorily resolved by the answering of one question, i.e., did Bendectin cause the relevant birth defects? In tying all of
these claims together, an argument could certainly be made as to
prejudice. That is, by not allowing the plaintiffs to present evidence as to
how they were individually affected by the drug, [the court's order] could
have resulted in prejudice to them in their attempt to establish the required elements of their case.
Id. a t 327.
80. Id. On the factual basis for the claims, see Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGSL.J. 301,
347 (1992)("The scientific community seems to have reached something close to a
consensus concerning the drug. While no study can remove all residual uncertainty
regarding Bendectin's safety, if the drug is a teratogen, it is a relatively mild
one . . . ."I.
81. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation:
22 (1989).
The Impact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE
[Ulnitary trial juries do tend to . . . utilize all the trial evidence
while deciding each individual trial issue. Indeed, the initial analysis of
the deliberations indicate[s] that unitary trial juries often do not decide
liability or causation until they hear evidence concerning damages.
Juries in separated trials appear to employ other, perhaps less sophisticated, heuristics to decide the issues. These latter juries tend to use
more extreme heuristics: corporatecapitalist versus the little guy; good
guy versus bad guy rhetoric dominates these deliberations. The bifurcation
of general causation in the separated trial condition produces greater
disbelief about causation yielding fewer verdicts for the plaintiffs. It may
be that only more extreme pro-plaintiff juries who appeal to the good
guy-bad guy [sic] rhetoric remain in the separated trial condition to vote
for the plaintiffs.
Id. a t 27.
82. Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in HARRY W. JONES, THE COURTS,THE PUI~LIC,
AND THE LAW EXPLOSION
48
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that courts sever more often when the case for liability appears
weak, but "when it is seen that the split trial reduces by more
than half the cases in which personal injury plaintiffs are successful, it is apparent that bifurcation makes a substantial
change in the nature of the jury trial itself."83

D. Judicial Burden
Finally, the assumption that consolidation invariably reduces the burden on judges, though popular, seems open to
question. Some proponents of broad consolidation seem to act
as if the law of diminishing returns has been repealed. But the
combination of cases may create an ungainly single litigation in
place of a series of commonplace cases." Discovery incentives
on both sides may be substantially altered by consolidation, as
may the incentives to dispute other matters. A joint trial may
be dispositive only if favorable to defendants, and otherwise
lead to individualized further proceedings in which the results
of the joint trial must be given effect. Thus, even the most
forceful justification for consolidation-judicial economy-may,
upon examination, prove to be an ambivalent one.

E. The Need for Clearer Guidelines
Over 60 years ago, Professor Chafee intoned that "[iln
matters of justice, . . . the benefactor is he who makes one
lawsuit grow where two grew before."85 More recently, however, we have seen reasons for skepticism about consolidation of
cases. The foregoing litany of concerns overstates the negative
potential of consolidation, but does point up serious grounds for
anxiety about when and how consolidation is ordered. Although
some conclude that Rule 42 provides adequate guidance on
those question^,^^ the reality is that the sole direction in the

(1965).
83. 9 WRIGHT& MILLER,
supra note 24, 8 2390, a t 508.
84. Other procedural devices may produce similar overload problems. See
Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The
Eficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701, 710-20 (1978) (exploring ways in which increased intervention may lower the quality of judicial
action by overloading the courts).
85. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace With Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1297, 1297 (1932).
86. Harris, supra note 14, a t 1292 ("The criteria for granting consolidation set
forth in rule 42(a) have been the subject of little controversy."); Gaylord A. Virden,
Consolidation Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The US.
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Rule is that the trial judge has broad discretion. That orientation was certainly the view when Rule 42 was originally adopted,87but given the increased importance of consolidation and
the attendant concerns sketched above, that orientation bears
reexamination. Confronted with such concerns as those addressed above,88the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended in 1990 that either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Manual for Complex Litigation should include
Neither the newly
guidelines for consolidation and severan~e.~'
minted Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, nor the Federal
Rules incorporates such specifics,g0but the ALI Project may be
a substitute source for such g~idance.~'

Rule 42 in Alice in Wonderland had the advantage of providing a precise standard for its application-persons more
than a mile high were banned from the court. Although there
might be debates on whether the rule applied to a given person-witness Alice's protest that she is not a mile high-it did
afford a relatively precise linear measure. The emphasis on
discretion lying behind Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Courts of Appeals Disagree on Whether Consolidation Merges the Separate Cases
and Whether the Cases Remain Separately Final for Purposes of Appeal, 141 F.R.D.
169, 169 (1991) ("[Tlhe law in this area is now largely settled.").
255
87. See, e.g., 18 FRANCIS A. DARNIEDER,HUGHESFEDERALPRACTICE
(1940) ("It is evident that the court must be given extensive discretionary powers
in order to expedite a determination of the issues and avoid delay and inconvenience."); ALEXANDER
HOLTZOFF,NEW FEDERALPROCEDURE AND THE COURTS116
(1940) ("In the interest of expediting and simplifying trials, the court is given
broad authority, on the one hand, to consolidate cases for trial and, on the other
hand, to order separation of different issues in the same case."); W.S. SMKINS,
FEDERALPRACTICE
70 (Alfred Schweppe ed. 1934) (Consolidation "is entirely within
the discretionary power of the court.").
88. See Memorandum fiom Richard L. Marcus to Workload Subcommittee,
Federal Courts Study Committee re guidelines for consolidation and severance proceWORKING
PAPERS
dures (Oct. 16, 1989) in 1 FEDERALCOURTSSTUDYCOMMITTEE,
AND SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORTS (1990) [hereinahr Marcus Memorandum]. This memorandum raises several of the concerns mentioned in the text.
89. REPORT OF THE FEDERALCOURTS STUDYC O M M I ~45
E (April 2, 1990).
90. The MANUAL, THIRD, supra note 32, 8 21.631, provides some general
guidelines regarding consolidation, but it does not come close to the Project in its
attention to the subject.
91. It should be noted that the then-current draft of the COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSALwas brought to the attention of the Federal Courts Study Committee in
connection with its recommendation. See Marcus Memorandum, supra note 88, a t
10-12.
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Procedure precludes similar precision, perhaps for good reason.92 The Multidistrict Litigation Act similarly lacks hard
guidance.g3 But given the centrality of consolidation to the
ALI Project, a more focused or confining regime seems in order.
To put this point in context, it is worthwhile to catalogue
the array of striking innovations the Project proposes in order
to facilitate consolidation. It recommends substituting a Complex Litigation Panel for the current Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation and vesting that body with authority to
transfer cases pending in federal court for trial as well as for
pretrial purposes.94This sort of revision has already been pro. ~ ~ Project goes beyond, however, and
posed in C o n g r e ~ s The
proposes authorizing the Panel to order the removal for consolidated treatment of otherwise nonremovable cases pending
in state court.96It also prescribes controversial approaches to
choice of law questions to remove the obstacles to consolidation
that could result from having different substantive law apply to
different cases.g7To avoid disruption of the consolidated litigation in the target court, the Project would additionally authorize the transferee court to enjoin "transactionally related proceedings" in state and federal courtsg8and to enter an order
that invites nonparties to intervene and binds them by its
determinations whether or not they accept the invitation."
Moving further beyond current law, the Project would authorize the Panel to direct transfer of cases filed in federal court to
a state transferee court under certain circumstance^,'^^ and it

92. Comment, supra note 29, at 381, states:
It is neither possible nor desirable for courts to treat motions under 42(a)
with the cold logic Alice displayed in dealing with Rule Forty-Two in
Wonderland. What is required is a constant sensitivity to the equities of
individual cases in conjunction with the experience courts have gained in
handling juries and in administrating the cases on their dockets.

Id.
93. See HERR,
supra note 64, $ 5.1, at 71 (stating $ 1407 criteria are merely
thresholds, and the statute "is of limited value in determining whether transfer is
appropriate in a particular case").
94. COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROPOSAL,
supra note 3, $ 3.02, at 62-70.
95. See, e.g., H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
96. COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, $$ 5.01-5.03, at 220-62.
97. Id. $4 6.01-6.08, at 321-436. These sections have drawn the most fire from
academic commentators. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law
for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX.L. REV. 1623 (1992).
98. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 5.04 at 263-75.
99. Id. $ 5.05, at 275-303.
100. Id. $ 4.01, at 177-201.
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recommends the adoption of an Interstate Complex Litigation
Compact to effect concentration of cases in courts of different
states.lol
This is heady stuff. The proposed authority to shift cases
properly filed in federal court to a state court, for example,
"would create a system that differs in material respects from
anything in our two centuries of constitutional and procedural
history."lo2 Although the proposed interstate compact has a
distant and thus-far unutilized actual analogy,lo3it would also
break new ground. Whether or not the Project's proposals
would, if adopted, cause "a complete revolution in the way in
which mass tort cases are decided today,"'" it is clear that
the goal of the Project goes well beyond time-saving and facilitation of litigation. Building on past experience with consolidation, the Project seeks very significantly to enhance the power to consolidate by removing longstanding obstacles that presently prevent or impede consolidation.
It is certainly possible to assess the Project's proposals
without focusing on whether increased consolidation itself is a
good thing.lo5 The Project itself was based on a preliminary
study that embraced an "intuition" that consolidation would
provide important advantages.lo6But as we have already seen,
Before embracing
there can be real costs to cons~lidation.'~~
these dramatic changes one would logically move beyond intuition and scrutinize the means adopted to avoid or minimize
these costs. The Project basically seeks to channel the power to
101. Id. 5 4.02, a t 201-16, app. B.
102. Steinman, supra note 58, a t 1038-39 (footnote omitted).
103. In 1991, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws endorsed a Uniform
Transfer of Litigation Act, but it has yet to be used. For discussion of that proposal, see Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Project With the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897 (1994).
104. Richard Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 61-62 (1990).
105. "Jurisdictional and transfer proposals to facilitate consolidation, then, can
proceed from a relatively agnostic position about how worthy consolidated
treatment is in various situations . . . ." Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Jurisdiction and
Transfer Proposals for Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 325, 326-27 (1991).
106. Before it embarked on the actual Project, the ALI did a study of complex
litigation that explained in its introduction that "[tlhis Preliminary Study is inspired by the intuition that the common transaction, series of transactions, or
course of conduct from which these complex cases arise should provide a basis for
some form of consolidated or coordinated treatment of all of the resulting litigation." AMERICANLAW INSTITUTE, PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEXLITIGATION5
(1987).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 47-84.

8791

THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM

901

consolidate in two ways: by articulating a standard for consolidation and by delegating prime responsibility for the decision
whether to consolidate to the Panel that it seeks to create. In
addition, the Project provides some guidance on severance. We
turn to these proposals now.

A. The Standard for Consolidation
Until now, consolidation has operated without any carefixlly articulated statutory or rule-based standards, relying instead
on ad hoc judgments by individual judges or by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. But ever since discussion of
expanding consolidation began a decade ago, proponents of
reforrn have recognized that they do not want to create "a legal
vacuum cleaner to suck all parties into a single federal court
regardless of the consequence^."'^^
The problem lies in providing sensible constraints. Buried
in Appendix B of the ALI Project, which contains a Reporters'
Study outlining a proposed interstate compact for consolidation
of cases pending in the courts of various states, is an elegant
comment that captures the difficulty confronting one who
would fashion such constraints:
Statisticians and epidemiologists describe and evaluate a
test with reference to its "sensitivity" and "specificity." The
probability that a positive test result will indicate the presence of the characteristic being tested for is its sensitivity.
Conversely, the probability that a negative test will indicate
the absence of the characteristic being tested for is the test's
specificity. The sensitivity and specificity of a test are a function of the threshold for a positive test result. When that
threshold is raised, there will be an increase in specificity and
a decrease in sensitivity. Thus, by increasing the threshold for
eligibility for consolidation, it is more likely that the cases
that are selected for consolidation will be best suited for unitary treatment (an increase in specificity). At the same time,
some cases that may have benefitted fkom unitary treatment
will not be eligible for consolidation (a decrease in sensitivi-

ty).log

108. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U . PA. L. REV. 7, 17 (1986).
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 3, at 467.
109. COMPLEX
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The problem confronting the framers of the Project was to find
the best balance between sensitivity and specificity.
One approach might be to adopt precise standards like
Rule 42 in Wonderland. Other proposals to expand consolidation have relied on precise limits on the number of claimants or
the dollar amount involved to provide a definite prerequisite for
c~nsolidation.''~On the floor of the American Law Institute as
the Project came up for its final vote, Judge Jack Weinstein
proposed that its provisions be conditioned on a similar prerequisite of 5,000 claimants with claims aggregating a t least $100
million, but this proposal was defeated."' The omission of such
a numerical prerequisite for consolidation is warranted. A predicate as high as the one proposed by Judge Weinstein could
only rarely be satisfied, leaving the entire work product of the
Project to sit on the shelf in all but the most extraordinary cases, and even then to come into play only after a great deal of
other litigation activity. Even with class actions, which do have
a numerosity prerequisite,112the actual number necessary for
class certification is uncertain and vastly below the number
proposed by Judge Weinstein.'13 To adopt a numerical prerequisite closer to the current multidistrict experience'" would mean
that the numerical requirement would be so easily satisfied

110. Thus, Professor Rowe and Mr. Sibley suggested that expanded federal
jurisdiction for complex cases could be limited to cases involving a t least 25 victims. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 108, a t 33, and Congress has considered statutes incorporating similar numerical limitations; see H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 2(a) (requiring that at least 25 natural persons be injured, each with damages in excess of $50,000).
111. See ALI Finishes Complex Litigation Project, Makes Progress on Various
Restatements, 61 U.S.L.W. 2709, 2710 (1993).
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(l) (allowing class actions only if class members
are too numerous to be joined).
113. See 7A CHARLESA. WRIGHTET AL., FEDERALPRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
9 1762 (1986) (citing cases allowing class status with classes of 25, 35, 40 and 50
members, but also citing cases that deny class certification on numerosity grounds
for classes as large as 350).
114. The ALI Project reports that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
has almost always found the benefits of transfer were satisfied if there are more
than five actions involved. COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t 52; see
also Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 1001, 1009-10 (1974) (noting transfer is "almost certain . . . if more than
five actions are involved").
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that it would place no significant restraint on » on solid at ion."^
Effective limitations must be sought elsewhere.
The ALI Project goes well beyond any other codified set of
consolidation guidelines in attempting to provide such limitations. Although this Article criticizes the vigor with which the
Project constrains consolidation in its central provisions, it
should acknowledge that the Project's basic scheme appears
wise and that the debate is about matters of implementation.
The starting point is to recognize, as noted above,l16 that consolidation and class action treatment "have increasingly been
regarded as alternative, indeed possibly fungible, mechanisms
for accomplishing aggregation."l17 The Project thus borrows
overtly from Rule 23, the class action rule,118but it also invokes
the same transaction standard that is articulated in Rule 20 for
permissive joinder of parties.
The Project's varied standards apply to different circumstances in which the Project proposes to authorize consolidation. The general standard for cases pending in federal court is
embodied in section 3.01, which is a watered down version of
Rule 23(b)(3). In contrast, the standard found in Reporters'
Study in Appendix B, for consolidation pursuant to the novel
proposed interstate compact, is a relatively direct adoption of
the Rule 23(b)(3) standard for class certification. In between,
section 5.01 articulates the standard for removal and adds a
"same transaction" test to the common question standard that
is embodied in section 3.01."~ These differences are justified on
115. The Project explains in commentary that "exact dimensional criteria" were
rejected in part because even when there are very few parties or cases, consolidation may be warranted due to complexity of the issues or volume of discovery, or
to "avoid significant duplication of effort [for a] defendant." COMPLEXLITIGATION
supra note 3, at 52-53.
PROPOSAL,
116. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
117. Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy
Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 256 (1991).
118. E.g., COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 49 ("A similar test
is applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) . . . ."); id. a t 117 ("The procedure for the
severance of issues under Rule 23(c)(4) is similar to that under Rule 42(b)."); id. a t
461 ("This standard is analogous to the criteria applied for class certification under
Federal Rule 23(b)(3) . . . ").
119. This description for the various consolidation criteria may prove confusing
to some readers, so it seems wise to provide a schematic summary of the criteria
employed in each of the three formats provided in the Project. As used below,
"minimum commonality" means that the consolidation provision only requires that
there be some common question. Similarly, "minimum superiority" means that the
consolidation provision only requires that consolidation "promote the just, efficient,
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the ground that jurisdiction and other factors extrinsic to the
pure consolidation decision mandate different treatment.120
Without focusing on the justifications offered for different treatment, this Article questions the departures from the Rule
23(b)(3)model on the grounds (1) that the class action standard
is sufficiently flexible for consolidation, and (2) that lowering
the threshold below that standard would be unwise.
Rule 23(b)(3) directs the court to certify a class only if it
finds that common questions predominate and that a class
action would be superior to other modes of adjudication. Certainly the same basic approach could be utilized to bring consolidation into parallel treatment with class actions. As the
Reporters of the Project recognized in emulating Rule 23(b)(3)
in Appendix B7 however, the class certification standard "is
more demanding than that set forth in 28 U.S.C. 8 1407 and
proposed [in section 3.01 of the Project] for the consolidation
and transfer of lawsuits within the federal system."121Section 3.01 requires only that there be one common question of
fact and that transfer "promote the just, efficient and fair conduct of the actions."'" Yet the commentary to section 3.01 begins with the following explanation:
The underlying premise of the consolidation standard set
forth in this section is that a series of related claims will not
be transferred for consolidated treatment unless the parties

and fair conduct of the actions," rather than directing that consolidation be ordered
only if it would be superior to individual litigation in terms of those criteria.

I

Commonality

Superiority

Same Transaction

5 3.01

minimum

minimum

not required

!j 5.01

minimum

minimum

required

predominance required

superiority required

not required

120. Thus, 5 5.01's addition of the same transaction requirement is justified on
the ground that "this section acts as a jurisdiction, as well as a consolidation,
mechanism." COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 225. Similarly, the
more stringent requirements of Appendix B are justified on the ground that combining cases from different state courts is more intrusive.
121. Id. at 461.
122. Id. at 37.
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and the judicial system will realize a significant savings in
time and resources . . . and those savings can be achieved in a
manner that is fair to the litigants.lu

In terms of both sensitivity and selectivity, the adoption of a
full-fledged Rule 23(b)(3) standard for consolidation by the
Reporters in Appendix B better serves these goals than the
watered-down version in section 3.01.

1. Predominance of common questions
The Reporters label Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that common questions predominate a "super-commonality" criterion
that is "more demanding" than the requirement of section 3.01
that there be a common question of fact.124But the Reporters
also recognize that predominance is "fairly specific and object i ~ e , " 'and
~ ~ make forceful arguments in commentary to Appendix B that underscore the usefulness of the predominance
requirement in achieving the goals they set for section 3.01.'~~
Looking beyond the Project, it is useful to recall
what the Reporters say in their treatise on federal practice
about the Rule 23(b)(3)predominance requirement:
[Tlhe predominance test really involves an attempt to achieve
a balance between the value of allowing individual actions to
be instituted so that each person can protect his own interests
and the economy that can be achieved by allowing a multiple
party dispute to be resolved on a class action basis."'

123. Id. at 38-39.
124. Id. at 463.
125. Id. at 462.
126. In explaining their use of the predominance standard in Appendix B, the
Reporters state:
[A] high threshold ensures a substantial overlap of claims or issues so
that the costs to the system and the parties of consolidation and management will not outweigh the costs of allowing the cases to remain dispersed. . . . [Tlhe requirement that common questions predominate serves
as a fairness safeguard, ensuring that claims or issues bearing no relation
to each other will not be gathered together. Treating dissimilar cases
alike would be as unfair as treating similar cases differently.
Id. at 463-64.
127. 7A WRIGHTET AL., supra note 113, 8 1777, at 518-19. Two of the authors
of this treatise, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, were, respectively, Reporter
PROPOSAL.
and Associate Reporter of the COMPLEX LITIGATION
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This sounds almost exactly like the goal the Reporters set for
Moreover, there is some language in the comsection 3.01.'~~
mentary to section 3.01 itself that suggests that even under the
proposed formulation of section 3.01, predominance should be
important.12' Indeed, the recently released Manual for Complex
Litigation, Third, cautions that "[u]nless common evidence
predominates, consolidated trials may lead to jury confusion
while failing to improve effi~iency."'~~
The sticking point, it seems, is the one the Reporters make
in Appendix B-that the predominance standard is fairly specific and objective.131Much as that might seem a selling point
to one concerned about controlling use of consolidation, the
commentary to section 3.01 emphasizes that for cases in federal
court section 3.01 allows "maximum discretion" to consolidate
and thereby makes the commonality standard "so minimal"
The Reporters reason
that it "rarely will be dispo~itive."'~~
that a predominance requirement would create a risk that the
standard would err on the side of specificity and unduly diminish sensitivity, precluding consolidation in some cases where it
should be employed.133But experience under Rule 23 suggests
that its predominance requirement has not hamstrung courts;
there the courts have treated the predominance standard as
satisfied if the common questions "represent a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the
They have not automatically
class in a single adj~dication."'~~
interpreted "predominance" to mean "determinative" or even
"signifi~ant."~~~
Even the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, op-

128. See supra text accompanying note 123.
129. "For example, the predominance of individual issues may suggest that
PROPOSAL,
consolidation will not promote justice or efficiency." COMPLEXLITIGATION
supra note 3, at 45. Note that this commentary is directed toward the second criterion of 5 3.01, discussed infia in text accompanying notes 141-52.
130. MANUAL,THIRD, supra note 32, 5 21.631.
131. See supra text accompanying note 121.
132. COMPLEXLITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 43.
133. The commentary explains:
A more restrictive standard, such as "predominance of common questions,"
is less desirable because situations might arise in which substantial benefits could be gained by transfer for consolidation even when only a single
common factual question is present because it would avoid the duplication
of effort that otherwise would result in resolving that issue in separate
suits.
Id.
134. 7A WRIGHTET AL., supra note 113, 5 1778, at 528.
135. Id. a t 528-29.
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erating under a statute with a minimal commonality requirement, has sometimes used predominance as a criterion for
transfer,ls6 and predominance has also been invoked in Rule
42 consolidation decisions.ls7
Other cases handled by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel
provide grounds for uneasiness about a minimalist approach to
commonality. That Panel rarely makes the common question
requirement determinative,ls8 but "simply identifies the common questions that exist and orders transfer without analyzing
their relation to the overall litigation to any great degree."139
At least in some cases, the commonality found sufficient seems

136. See, eg., In re Eli Lilly & Co. Oraflex Prod. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp.
422, 423 (J.P.M.L. 1984) ("Although we recognize that the actions in this litigation
involve some common questions of fact, we are not persuaded that these common
questions of fact will, in the future course of this litigation, predominate over individual questions of fact . . . ."); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Employment Practices
Litig., 487 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (J.P.M.L. 1980) ("Individual rather than common
factual questions predominate regarding the liability aspects of the five actions before us," and the common factual questions do not "overcome the overall predominance of individual factual questions . . . ."); In re Airline "Age of Employee" Employment Practices Litig., 483 F. Supp. 814, 814 (J.P.M.L. 1980) (denying transfer
after district court rejected motion to consolidate under Rule 42 because common
questions do not predominate); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Employment
Discrim. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 937, 939 (J.P.M.L. 1977) ("[I]ndividual rather than
common factual questions predominate in this litigation."); In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prod. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.L. 1977)
("Many factual questions unique to each action or to a group of actions already
pending in a single district clearly predominate, and therefore transfer is unwarranted."); In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litig., 342 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (J.P.M.L.
1972) (noting that parties have argued convincingly that common issues do not
predominate); see also In re "The Exorcist" Copyright Infringement Litig., 411 F.
Supp. 793, 793-94 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (rejecting argument that common questions do
not predominate).
137. See Close v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 1994 WL 761957, at *3
(D.N.H. 1994) ("On the basis of the record before it, the court finds that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that a Rule 42(a) consolidation is appropriate here. . . . [Blecause individual issues in the civil actions predominate
over common issues, separate depositions, interrogatories, and requests for documents will be more beneficial to plaintiffs than consolidated discovery."); Scardino
v. Amalgamated Bank, 1994 WL 408180, a t *2 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("Although there
are common questions of law or fact in both actions as to the validity of the note
and mortgage, these questions are not sufficiently predominant in this action to
warrant consolidation."); Maruzen I d 1 Co., Ltd. v. Bridgeport Merchandise, Inc.,
1991 WL 130170, a t *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ordering consolidation because common
questions predominate); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. 118 F.R.D.
440, 441 (N.D. 111. 1987) ("Although certain common issues of fact may exist in
both actions, the variety of individual issues predominate.").
138. But see cases cited supra note 136.
139. 15 WRIGHTET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 8 3863, a t 515 (2d
ed. 1986).
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almost nonexistent. For example, in In re Aviation Products
Liability ~itigation'~'the Panel was presented with a series of
cases pending in districts in seven states and involving malfunctioning helicopter engines. The helicopters in question were
made by two different manufacturers, and the claims were
quite disparate. A number of the cases presented claims by
corporate helicopter owners for damages to the helicopters and
their businesses due to malfimctioning of the engines. Other
cases involved personal injury claims by people injured in helicopter crashes. Still other cases involved claims that the helicopter frames had been improperly designed and that certain
helicopters had not been properly maintained. The only link
among the cases was that each helicopter had the same make
of engine, although different components of that engine were
cited as responsible for different incidents. Despite vigorous
opposition from many parties, the Panel ordered transfer, reasoning that "although the specific defects alleged in each separate case may not be identical they are all interwoven so as to
cover the engine's general condition and airw~rthiness."'~~
It may be that the Panel's action in Aviation Products was
appropriate since the consolidation there was purely pretrial.
But if the ALI Project's goal in requiring only minimal commonality is to facilitate consolidation in cases like Aviation
~ r o d u c t s , the
' ~ ~predominance requirement seems an important

140. 347 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
141. Id. a t 1402.
142. This case was not unique in the annals of the Panel. In In re Multi-piece
Rim Products Liability Litigation, 464 F. Supp. 969 (J.P.M.L. 1979), the Panel
transferred 19 actions brought in 14 different districts to recover for injuries related to the failure of multipiece truck wheels. These products were manufactured by
four different companies, a t least one of which was sued in each case, and 21
other defendants were named in the actions, but 19 of these were named in only
one case. Id. a t 971. Opponents to the transfer, including plaintiffs in five of the
actions and all defendants but one, emphasized that each case involved unique
facts. The Panel nevertheless ordered transfer based on the parties' theory that all
of the products were "essentially the same, for purposes of this litigation, because
they all operate on the same engineering principle." Id. a t 974.
Similarly, in In re Multidistrict Commodity Credit Corp. Litig. Involving Grain
Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1969), 32 separate claims were made
against a variety of railroad companies for alleged losses of grain during shipment.
Different kinds of grain were involved in different shipments, but all were in covered hopper cars. Although each claim would turn on the individual circumstances
involved in that shipment, the Panel found common questions regarding "general
standards for loading and unloading hopper cars, general standards for weighing
hopper cars, the integrity of the hopper cars by design and manufacture and the
amount of shrinkage or loss of moisture which normally occurs in these grains." Id.
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limitation.'" In essence, the Project's rejoinder appears to be
that the primary protection against improper consolidation in
section 3.01 is provided by the other element of its test, which
directs that consolidation be ordered only where it "will promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions."'"
But that prong of section 3.01 also omits an important directive
that the Reporters included in Appendix B-that consolidation
of the cases be "superior to their separate adjudi~ation."'~~
2. Superiority
The superiority requirement also comes from Rule 23(b)(3)
and also appears well-crafted to ensure that consolidation is
used only when it is appropriate. Here again, the difference
between section 3.01 and Appendix B appears to be designed to
emphasize the Project's resolve that a more demanding standard be met before consolidation is effected only in situations
governed by Appendix B." This has resulted in an unnecessary watering down of the standard for consolidation within the
federal system. Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement does not
impose undue burdens. Instead, the requirement only directs
the court to verify that a class action would be "sufficiently
effective to justify the expenditure of the judicial time and
energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class action and to
assume the risk of prejudice to the rights of those who are not
directly before the court."147The commentary on section 3.01
suggests that section 3.01 is designed to ensure that courts
follow the same analysis before approving ons solid at ion,'^^ and
it may be essential to upgrade the black letter of section 3.01 to
avoid making the consolidation standard spineless.
As Professor Brunet has cogently noted, there is a pervasive tendency for efficiency to trump competing policies in aggregation decisions,'" and a spineless consolidation standard

at 1404.
143. Cf: Note, supra note 114, at 1016 (characterizing Aviation Products as a
questionable use of the Panel's transfer power).
144. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 3.01(a)(2), at 37.
145. Id., app. B, 8 l(a)(2).
146. Thus the Reporters are able to note in Appendix B that %]he inclusion of
a superiority requirement is more demanding than the standard proposed for federal intrasystem consolidation. Compare 4 3.01(a)(2)."Id. at 464.
147. 7A WRIGHTET AL., supra note 113, 8 1779, at 552.
148. See supra text accompanying note 123.
149. See Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Com-
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enables judges to succumb to that tendency. The experience of
the current Multidistrict Litigation Panel provides substantial
evidence to support this concern and should give Congress
pause when it evaluates section 3.01. As originally proposed to
Congress by the judiciary, the multidistrict transfer statute did
not even call for attention to party interests in the decision
whether to transfer, but Congress inserted party interests as a
criterion under the Act.lS0Nevertheless, it seems to be generally recognized that party interests have not been given significant weight by the current Panel,'" and one commentator has
accused the Panel of "failure to heed this congressional admoni~hrnent."'~~
Whatever the propriety of disregarding party interests
when transfer is ostensibly for pretrial purposes only, the prac%iceseems contrary to what the Project says it is doing in creating authority for the new Complex Litigation Panel to consolidate for trial. The factors that govern transfer under section 3.01 clearly include party interest^,'^^ and the Project's
commentary takes account of such interests as well.'" In order

peting Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273 (1991).
150. See 28 U.S.C. 9 1407(a) (1988) (allowing transfer if it "will be for the
convenience of parties and witnesses").
151. Wilson W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotharn, Complex Multidistrict Litigation-An
Overview of 28 U.S.C.A. $ 1407, 31 BAYLORL. REV. 33, 43 (1979)
("[Tlhe Panel has largely eliminated this guideline as a determinative standard.");
Note, supra note 114, a t 1001, 1003 (1974) ("Once a threshold level of potential
savings [of time and effort for judges] is found, however, transfer is almost inevitable.").
152. Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 720 (1991).
153. Section 3.01(b)(2) says one factor "to be considered" is whether "consolidation can be accomplished in a way that is fair to the parties and does not result
in undue inconvenience to them and the witnesses." COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,supra note 3, 8 3.01(b)(2), a t 38.
154. E.g., COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 44. According to
that commentary:
The just and fair resolution of the actions requires a recognition that
intrusion on party autonomy and control can be justified only when there
is some reason to treat the underlying cases in a coordinated fashion . . . . Consolidation may be ordered only if it will serve fairness and
efficiency goals better than allowing the cases to remain dispersed. A
party's desire to exercise individual control over the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit, for instance, is a long recognized, but intangible, interest.
Id. a t 51.
Because the proposed standard promotes consolidation for trial as well as
pretrial, the convenience of the parties and the witnesses must be accord-
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to put teeth into the commitment to party interests, a superiority requirement is preferable. Whether a superiority requirement would be sufficient remains debatable. Although the
Project does recognize party interests, it also emphasizes in the
commentary to section 3.01 that "the decision whether to transfer and consolidate remains dis~retionary,"'~~
using language
virtually identical to the commentary to Appendix B,lS6which
does require a finding of superiority. Ultimately some discretion seems inevitable for, as Professor Brunet has noted, both
fairness and efficiency are multifaceted con~epts?~But if Appendix B really is to be as elastic as section 3.01, there is reason to suspect that it is not sufficiently strict.
One step toward confining the latitude is, as mentioned
above, to require predominance of common questions as a prerequisite to consolidation. Additionally insisting on a finding of
superiority, and treating that as a serious requisite, appears a
further positive step. In essence the superiority reasoning calls
for the court to examine the pros and cons of consolidating the
cases or leaving them to proceed separately. Although by no
means a straightjacket, the balancing can be considerably more
than a meaningless exercise. Consolidation need not be denied
merely because the consolidated action would be ungainly or
hard to manage, but consolidation must be justified by findings
based on an actual comparison between consolidated and individual handling of the litigation. Such a comparison gives effect
to the Project's objective that consolidation only occur when it
actually is preferable to individual litigation. More precise
requirements on the superiority prong are probably undesirable. The Project itself examines a variety of considerations,
and there will be instances in which some of these favor consolidation while others do not. In such circumstances, it will be up

ed more careful consideration than would be the case if transfer and
consolidation were limited to the pretrial proceedings.
Id. at 51.
155. Id. a t 52.
156. See id. at 469.
157. Brunet, supra note 149, at 275-76 (footnote omitted). A tension between
efficiency and fairness clearly exists, but the precise nature of that tension defies a
simple, satisfactory definition because both terms incorporate many concepts. Efficiency is a vague idea having numerous meanings both generally and as applied to
complex litigation. Similarly, the meaning of fairness may range from an autonomous right to a single trial without cooperating with any co-parties to a seemingly
contradictory right to intervene in a complex case initiated by another in order to
protect one's interests. Id.
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to the Panel to balance the various factors and decide whether
to consolidate.
3. Same transaction
The Project's consolidation standard offers yet another
wrinkle in section 5.01, which proposes a new removal jurisdiction that would allow the Panel to combine cases pending in
state court with cases pending in federal court. Besides invoking the standard of section 3.01 and requiring "consideration of
whether removal will unduly disrupt or impinge upon state
court or regulatory proceedings," section 5.01 removal is available only if the state cases "arise from the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" as the
cases pending in federal court.'" It appears that the same
transaction provision, which is similar to that in Federal Rule
20(a), was added because there is a jurisdictional aspect to
section 5.01.'" But the operation of the Rule 20 provision tends
to devolve into a variant of the commonality principle.160Although consolidation based on common question is said to be
broader than joinder under Rule 20,'~' and the commentary to
the Project strives valiantly to show that the same transaction
test is an important addition to section 5.01,'~' the Reporters'
Notes acknowledge that situations will rarely satisfy the commonality prong but fail to satisfjr the same transaction test as
well.

158. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 5 5.01(a), at 220-21.
159. See id. at 225.
160. Thus, an oft-cited formulation of the Rule 20 same transaction inquiry is
Judge Aldrich's explanation in Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 160 F.
Supp. 580, 581 (D. Mass. 1958): "[Tlhere can be no hard and fast rule, and . . .
the approach must be the general one of whether there are enough ultimate factual concurrences that it would be fair to the parties to require them to defend
jointly [the several claims] against them . . . ."
161. See 9 WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 24, 5 2382, at 432-33.
PROPOSAL,
supra note 3, at 225-27. For example,
162. See COMPLEXLITIGATION
the commentary cites Stanford v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 18 F.R.D. 152 (M.D.
Tern. 1955), seemingly as an example of a case involving what the Project views
as "distinct occurrences" that would not satisfy the same transaction test even
though they involve common fact issues. Id. at 226. It is true that the court so
ruled in that case, but in his treatise on federal practice Professor Miller, one of
PROPOSAL,
says of this case that "the
the Reporters on the COMPLEX LITIGATION
holding that joinder was improper seems quite doubtful." 9 WRIGHT& MILLER,
supra note 24, 5 2382, at 433 n.14. Thus the Reporters' own example reinforces
the conclusion that the same transaction test really adds nothing.
163. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 228.
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4. A reprise on the standard

Despite endorsing full-fledged invocation of both the predominance and superiority standards borrowed from Rule
23(b)(3), this section should end with a recognition of the importance of the Project's contribution to resolving the consolidation conundrum. In an aggressively standardless area, the
Project has provided an analytical format that identifies and is
sensitive to the competing considerations. In order to ensure
that the overall standard in fact constrains consolidation decisions, it would be better to fortify it to equal the one in Appendix B. But any sensible standard will have significant flexibility. The recommended one would be neither self-executing nor
scalpel-like.

B. The Panel as Implementor
Besides articulating a standard for consolidation, the Project seeks to regulate its use by assigning primary, or at least
initial, authority for the consolidation decision to the Complex
Litigation Panel it proposes to establish? This sort of expanded authority to consolidate for trial has been proposed in the
past for the current Multidistrict Litigation
and it
seems clearly preferable to the alternatives of conferring the
authority entirely on the transferor or transferee judge, or
Placing consolidation
leaving it to the parties' preferen~es.'~~
authority in the Complex Litigation Panel would mark a
change from the current arrangement in which transferee judges often exercise such authority under the guise of 28 U.S.C.
8 1404(a). Reliance on the Panel would foster consistency in
handling consolidation and ensure that judges fully familiar
with the Project's textured consolidation standard would, a t
least initially, make the decision whether that standard is
satisfied. 167

164. For consolidation pursuant to Appendix B, the Reporters propose creation
of an Interstate Complex Litigation Panel of state judges. See COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROJECT, supra note 3, app. B, 5 2(a). Although this would be a different entity,
the nature of the constraint provided by centralization of authority would be similar. Accordingly, this wrinkle is not treated separately in the text.
165. See Fthodes, supra note 152, a t 712; Cooney, supra note 28, a t 611.
166. See COMPLEX
LITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 64-66.
167. See id. a t 63 (stating that the Panel would develop "a unique competence"
to make this decision, and its involvement would promote predictability).
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Sensible though it is, relying on the Panel to decide consolidation issues is not a cure-all for the difficulties that attend
consolidation. To begin with, timing creates a serious problem
for the Panel. For good reasons, the Panel's decision whether to
consolidate should ordinarily be made as early as p0ssib1e.l~~
But a t that time there may be significant uncertainty about
critical aspects of the litigation that bear on the wisdom of
consolidation, so that the Panel will have to rely on an informed guess. The Project's commentary suggests that the
Panel can delegate fact-gathering responsibility to a "special
master" if it does not know enough about the cases,16' but
this option would rarely be helpful since it would only delay
matters. At least one piece of information that is often important-the law to be applied-will by definition be unavailable
to the Panel when its consolidation decision must be made. The
Project authorizes the transferee judge to select governing
principles of law in some circumstance^,'^^ but of necessity that
decision can only be made after transfer. The choice of law
decision could, however, have a significant bearing on whether
there are common questions, and whether those predominate.
More generally, owing to the need to adjust the nature of consolidation in the face of later developments, or to undo
consolidation entirely, the transferee judge has authority to
reconsider or revise a consolidation order of the Panel.l7'
Hence, although the Panel should be a better arbiter, it cannot
be a final arbiter, and considerable power must continue to reside in the transferee judge.
In addition, there is room for skepticism about the enthusiasm the Panel will bring to some of the consolidation criteria,
particularly those that deal with fairness and litigant interests.
As noted above, the current Multidistrict Panel has been notably indifferent to Congress' insistence that litigants' interests
be a coequal factor in making transfer decision for pretrial
purposes.172Perhaps there is something in the implicit mission

168. Id. 5 3.03(a) (stating that the panel should decide on consolidation "as
soon as possiblen so that parties and court know whether it will occur).
169. Id. at 68.
170. See id. $5 6.01-.08, at 321-436.
171. Id. at 108. Whether a transferee judge could use 5 1404(a) to effect consolidation for trial where the Panel had determined that such consolidation should
not occur presents a nice question. It is not clear that such an order would be
subject to review by the Panel under section 3.07(b).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
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statement for the Panel that accelerates the tendency Professor
Brunet notes to exalt efficiency over litigant interests and other
considerations. A Chief Justice may be expected to select
judges for such a Panel who support the idea of aggregated
treatment, or at least to pass over judges who are distinctly
skeptical about it (if any still exist). The dynamics of the Panel
itself may tend to reinforce this likely initial preference for
aggregation. Hence, although the Panel would have a "national
focus and overview" that would put it in an "optimal position to
consider the interests of the entire judicial system,"'" it is
less clear that the Panel would be "relatively neutral in making
the transfer for consolidation deci~ion.""~
To the contrary, although the Panel might be expected to approach the selection
of a transferee district neutrally, it would probably have a distinct bent in favor of transfer. A transferee judge may similarly
approach the transfer/consolidation question with indifference
to party interest^.'^^
In sum, the fact that consolidation decisions are initially to
be made by the Complex Litigation Panel does not substantially lessen the need to fortify the standard for consolidation, as
urged above. Particularly given the experience under the current Multidistrict Litigation Panel, a clear declaration of the
prerequisites to transfer is in order.

C. Fragmentation of Cases
The natural tendency of consolidation toward bifurcation,
trifurcation, and beyond would be further fueled were the
Project's proposals adopted. The Project's black letter suggests
that the transferee judge consider "structuring of the litigation
by separating the issues into those common questions that
should be treated on a consolidated basis and those individual
questions that should not."'77 The Project further directs that

173. See supra text accompanying note 149.
174. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 62.
175. Id.
176. "The concept of 'convenience of parties and witnesses' takes on an entirely
different meaning when a 8 1404(a) motion, encompassing tens or hundreds of
cases, is brought before a 8 1407 transferee court. In such a setting, the interests
of the individual litigants are subordinated to the collective good." Rhodes, supra
note 152, at 741.
177. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 3.06(a), at 106. Comparable authority is proposed in the Reporters' Appendix B for the transferee state
judge who receives cases transferred by the Interstate Complex Litigation Panel.
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the transferee judge prepare a plan for the disposition of the
litigation that "shall specify whether the entire action or only
specified issues shall be determined in the transferee district
and also shall provide for the disposition of the issues not to be
determined in the transferee court."178To implement this trial plan, the judge has "broad discretion" to return "individual
issues" to the court from which the case originated or to transfer them to yet another transferee district.17gWhen cases are
removed from state court pursuant to the Project's new removal
jurisdiction, this power to decide which issues will be consolidated for trial could lead to issues in the same case being resolved in different court systems.180As we have seen, such
fragmented litigation is not cost free.181But since bifurcation is
more a by-product than the primary goal of the Project, it will
not be examined in detail here.
The starting point in assessing the bifurcation issue is to
recognize that, despite the rather longstanding debate about
the desirability of bifurcation under Rule 42(b), there has been
rather little direction on when bifurcation should be employed.la2The Project does not stop at creating expanded authority to fragment cases, however; it also provides a detailed
analysis of the issues bearing on the use of the severance power that is unequalled in any similar source. The commentary
identifies and addresses several important problems and supplies guidance on dealing with these issues even for those who
disagree with the Project's position on some of the problems.
Although the best way to obtain insight into the severance
issues addressed is to read the pertinent portions of the Project, a canvass here identifies the matters covered.
First, the Project categorizes and chronicles the types of
issues that might usefully be severed according to case type.
For example, it identifies four determinations that need to be
made in "antitrust, securities, products liability and mass disaster litigation," suggesting that general causation and liabili-

See id. app. B, 5 6(a).
178. Id. 5 3.06(b), at 106.
179. Id. 5 3.06(c), at 106.
180. "Section 5.01tc) . . . contemplates intersystem rather than intrasystem bifurcation of a single case before one court." Id. at 237.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 47-84.
182. See Henderson et al., supra note 72, at 1684 ("[Olnly very vague standards exist for determining the appropriateness of a judge's decision to hold a
bifurcated trial.").
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ty can often be separated from specific causation and damages.lg3It offers similar analyses of copyright, patent and contract
litigati~nl*~
and supports consolidation of punitive damages?
It also offers guidance on whether the transferee court should
retain or transfer individual issues after severing them .Ig6
Second, the Project recognizes that severance conflicts with
the tradition of a unitary trial and insists that this consequence of severance be considered before the procedure is employed.lg7But it properly goes on to note that the principal
problem area for severance is in personal injury litigation and
that "[ilssue severance has operated without any real problem
or challenge in the securities and antitrust fields."lg8 In the
same vein, the Project identifies the prodefendant shift in results that seems to attend bifurcation between liability and
damages in personal injury caseslg9and recognizes that there is
an "important philosophical issue"1g0about whether the breed
of jury nullification of liability rules that seems to occur i n
unitary trials should be fostered. The Reporters' Notes suggest
that, at least in complex litigation, there is no alternative to
severance despite the nullification effect.lgl
Third, the Project identifies the sterile trial problem and
explores the Sixth Circuit's grappling with that problem.192I t
suggests that allowing plaintiffs to introduce some evidence of
their injuries during the liability portion of the trial could ameliorate the sterile trial problem, although this strategy will not
entirely eliminate the problem.lg3 Conceding that the cure is

183. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 3, a t 114.
184. Id. a t 114-15.
185. Id. a t 115. The justification for this position seems essentially substantive-to avoid crippling multiple punitive damage awards against defendants.
186. Id. a t 126. For example, i t observes that "damage issues that are linked
inextricably to factual determinations already made in the magnet court sometimes
may benefit from being handled by the transferee judge." Id.
187. "[Ilssue severance . . . must be undertaken with great care in recognition
that it alters the tradition of how cases are decided. Before a court adopts the procedure in a particular case, the possible effects severance may have on the proceedings must be considered." Id. a t 119-20. For a discussion of these issues, see
Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of
Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U . Prm. L. REV.725 (1989).
supra note 3, a t 120.
188. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
189. Id. a t 120-21; see supra text accompanying note 82.
190. COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROPOSAL,
supra note 3, a t 120.
191. Id. a t 125.
192. Id. a t 121-23; see supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
PROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 122.
193. COMPLEX
LITIGATION
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incomplete, the Project nevertheless recommends bifurcation
because the advantages are likely to outweigh the disadvantages, and because "judicious use of separate trials is essential to
the effective functioning of the jury system."lg4 But it cautions that "trifurcation is more questionable than bifurcation."lg5
Fourth, it argues that severance will actually improve the
fairness of consolidated proceedings by preserving the plaintiffs'
control over litigation of individual issues. lg6Of course, severance does involve the left hand giving back some of what the
right hand took away, since consolidation caused the loss of
control in the first place. Moreover, this restoration of control
may be less significant than the Project suggests unless accompanied by a return of the case to the original court, where the
lawyers initially retained by the plaintiffs can more conveniently participate.
Fifth, the Project offers some commonsense tips on employing severance. Thus, it suggests that putting simple issues first
may avoid undue expense if more cumbersome issues can
thereby be avoided.lg7It also suggests that the "judge may
empanel multiple juries to see whether" they reach conflicting
outcomes in order to protect against the possibility of an anomalous verdict.lg8
Finally, the Project proposes to create special appellate
avenues to provide early review of certain aspects of severed
proceedings, recognizing that special treatment should be accorded severance orders. It would authorize the Complex Litigation Panel to review the transferee judge's orders to transfer
issues.199Although the Panel's authority does not extend to all
the very
severance decisions made by the transferee judge:''
existence of review authority recognizes the special impact that

194. Id. at 123.
195. Id. at 122.
196. See id. at 109 ("[Alllowing for consolidation of issues rather than entire
claims increases the possibility that the individual litigant will be represented
adequately . . . without sacrificing the ability of individual parties to control the
litigation of unique issues.").
197. Id. at 111.
198. Id. at 123.
199. Id. 8 3.07(b), at 129. The Panel would have discretion not to undertake
such review.
200. See id. at 137 ("It does not embrace questions regarding possible prejudice
or inefficiencies surrounding a decision to have a consolidated trial on a particular
issue or to sever certain issues for individual treatment.").
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severance decisions can have on cases.201In addition to Panel
review of certain severance orders, the Project would authorize
immediate review of liability determinations by an appellate
court when the question of liability has been separately adjudicated, even though damages issues remain to be
Perhaps other, more precise guidelines for severance might
be proposed.203Certainly transferee judges will have significant
latitude in shaping cases, and the Project's overall orientation
is sympathetic to the use of transferee discretion. But the commentary does catalogue and take seriously the potential drawbacks, as well as offering some particulars such as the comment that trifircation is more dubious than bifur~ation.~'~
One
idea that might help in the decision to bifurcate, as with the
initial decision to consolidate,205is superiority; the black letter
could direct that bifurcation only be used if superior to unitary
trial. In a consolidation situation, however, a superiority requirement in the bifurcation analysis would seem to add little
to the superiority requisite in the consolidation itself, were that
vigorously applied. Neither in Rule 42(b) nor elsewhere in procedural law is there a source for borrowing guidelines on fragmentation as there is in Rule 23(b)(3) for the question of cons ~ l i d a t i o nAccordingly,
.~~~
despite concern about over-fragmen201. As the commentary explains:
The potential impact of those decisions warrants an opportunity for discretionary review even though modification is possible. For example, plaintiffs erroneously forced to remain for a consolidated trial in a distant
forum may face prohibitive litigation costs, subordination of their individual claims or defenses, or undue delay. . . . Not only would increased costs
pose a hardship to plaintiffs, but also they might affect the outcome of
the litigation. Plaintiffs unable to bear the financial burden might feel
obliged to settle for less than they otherwise might have secured.
Id. a t 136.
202. Id. 5 3.07(c), a t 130.
203. Henderson et al., supra note 72, a t 1694-95, propose that in mass tort
cases bifurcation only be allowed when two conditions are satisfied: "First, any
issue to be tried separately must be common to all of the claims. Second, the relevant societal interests must clearly outweigh the interests of individual claimants
in . . . a single, unified proceeding." But this constraint on judicial decision-making
does not seem particularly stronger than the prescription of the Project.
204. See COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 122 ("[Tlrifurcation
is more questionable than bifurcation.").
205. See supra text accompanying notes 146-57.
206. Indeed, the Rule 23 analogy tends, if anything, to undercut the constraints this Article urges for consolidation and bifurcation. Rule 23(c)(4)(A) allows
the court to certify a class only "with respect to particular issues," implicitly bifurcating the claims of all class members thereby. Although this issue certification
power seems to erode the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) by allowing
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tation of cases, this Article does not propose fortifying the
Project's provisions on bifurcation as it does urge for the consolidation standard.

D. The Question Before Congress
By assessing the value of consolidation in dealing with
complex litigation, this Article illuminates whether Congress
should embrace the Project's effort to facilitate consolidation.
Although it urges fortifjing the standard for consolidation by
making that standard more directly parallel to the handling of
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), on balance the Article finds
that the Project provides a thorough and balanced examination
of the consolidation conundrum. Does that mean that Congress
should embrace the Project's central goal of facilitating consolidation?
The answer is uncertain. For one thing, there are a variety
of federalism and other objections to the Project's proposals
that other scholars have addressed. Beyond that, there is what
might be called empirical uncertainty about consolidation itself.
This Article has approached the question almost entirely on the
doctrinal level. The issues raised by consolidation that were
identified in Part 111,207however, really cannot be quantified in
a way susceptible to doctrinal pres~ription.'~~
The Project's
approach is to identify the issues and propose consideration of
them by the Panel and later by the transferee judge. Judges
have an experiential basis for such determinations, but one
might conclude that their information base is too limited, or
that they are too likely to be seduced into disregarding any
counterbalances against consolidation in their quest for efficiency and broad-gauge disposition of litigation.

the judge to excise and disregard noncommon issues, we are told that certification
of specific issues can be used even if there is only one common issue, and that i t
should be used in such a circumstance rather than deny class certification. See 7B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, $ 1790, a t 271, 276. The Project notes the similarity of issue severance under Rules 23(c)(4) and 42(b). See COMPLEXLITIGATION
PROPOSAL,supra note 3, a t 117. Were the attitude of severance rather than denial
of aggregation borrowed for consolidation, the consequence might be a stronger
push toward bifurcation than the Project endorses.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 36-91.
208. Compare quantifiable factors such as the amount in controversy in diversity cases. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1332(a) (discussing situations "where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000").
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Under these circumstances, it may not be enough to point
out that the Project's effort to overcome the obstacles to consolidation "hardly refled[s] focused consideration of the desirable
scope of possible cons~lidation."~~~
Even arbitrary limits can
look attractive when they confine a disquieting, unknown force.
The Project has not dispelled all misgivings about aggressive
use of consolidation and severance of issues. Indeed, to a substantial extent the Project seems tempted to fall back on the
argument not that consolidation is desirable, but that it is the
only stopgap available to prevent chaos.210That is hardly a
positive argument for consolidation and may be insufficient to
carry the day for the Project's aggressive reforms designed to
make consolidation more readily available.
PROVISIONS,
V. THEROLEOF THE PROJECT'S CONSOLIDATION
ASSUMING
CONGRESS
DOESNOTACT
The ALI has not had great success in the past in prodding
Congress into action. Its 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts proposed a number of
statutory changes, but none were enacted until the Federal
Courts Study Committee recommended some of them in
1990.~"Assuming that Congress responds to the Project as it
did to the Study, one would not expect to see the jurisdictional
and other innovations recommended by the Project enacted in
the near future. These striking ideas about jurisdiction and
choice of law will (as did the 1969 Study) serve principally as
fodder for law school classes. Some, therefore, criticize the
Project because it is directed only a t C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ' ~
Relegation to law school curriculum need not be the fate of
the Project's analysis of consolidation, however. Without any

209. Rowe, supra note 105, at 327.
210. E.g., Sherman, supra note 117, a t 236-37 ("If plaintiffs cannot get their
individual cases tried, aggregation may offer the only realistic opportunity for judicial resolution short of settlement.").
211. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that Congress amend
the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 5 1391, (a) to place the then-current authorization of venue in the district "in which the claim arose" with language suggested
by the ALI study and (b) to eliminate the disparities then allowed between federal
cases based soley on diversity and other federal cases. See REPORTOF THE FEDERAL COURTSSTUDY COMMITTEE,
supra note 89, a t 94. Congress so amended 5 1391
in 1990.
212. "The Project . . . really poses a working agenda for only one
group--Congress." Shreve, supra note 9, a t 1144.
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further action by Congress, as we have seen,213transfer and
consolidation decisions are repeatedly and increasingly made,
and related severance orders are often entered. That is the
reason why the Federal Courts Study Committee also recommended in 1990 that guidelines for consolidation and bifurcaPerhaps the Project can be used as a
tion be pr~mulgated.~"
source of the kind of guidance for judges that the Committee
desired.
The ALI's work product has proved much more influential
with judges than with Congress. Its restatements have proved
enormously successful in influencing the law?l5 sometimes too
much so in the view of some
The restatements have
become almost an art form that can serve as a vehicle for all
purposes.217Like the restatements, the Project may influence
judges confronting consolidation decisions even though its jurisdictional and choice of law proposals have not been enacted.218
One important influence would be on the members of the current Multidistrict Litigation Panel; in making their transfer
decisions under the current statute they could find much of use
in the Project's discussion of transfer and consolidation. Similarly, transferee judges could find in the Project exactly the
sort of blueprint for handling consolidation and severance decisions that the Federal Courts Study Committee urged. Outside
the transfer context altogether, the growing importance of con-

213. See supra Part 11.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
215. "As of March 1994, the ALI counted over 125,000 court citations to the
restatements. United States Supreme Court Justices invoked the restatements in
nine cases during the 1993-94 term. Judges in all fifty states have looked to
them." Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin
and the American Law Institute, Address at the University of Wisconsin Law School
(Oct. 28, 19941, in 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (footnote omitted).
216. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J . LEGALSTUD.
461, 511-18 (1985) (arguing that 5 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts--dealing with strict products liability-was insinuated into the restatement
by a cabal of law professors); Paul A. Simmons, Government by an Unaccountable
Private Non Profit Corporation, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J . HUM. RTS.67, 97 (1992) (urging
that "ALI publications should not be given precedential effect in any court proceeding unless or until the ALI has been democratized*).
217. See, e.g., Gretchen Craft Rubin & Jamie G. Heller, Note, Restatement of
Love (Tentative Draft.), 104 YACE L.J. 707 (1994).
218. "Even if Congress does not enact it, the Proposed Final Draft will undoubtedly influence judicial opinion for many years to come." Symeon C.
Symeonides, The ALI's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA L. REV. 843, 844-45 (1994).
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solidation and severance of issues provides a ready market for
the learning offered by the Project. Unlike the 1969 study of
federal jurisdiction, then, the Project may become a vital part
of the litigation scene.
Given this prospect, the diversity of consolidation standards contained in the Project is particularly unfortunate. For
one thing, the existence of three standards is simply confusing.219More significant, however, is the fact that the Project
principally relies on a watered-down shadow of Rule 23(b)(3)'s
requirements. At least one may hope that judges will, as recommended in this Article, actually embrace the more vigorous
requirements of Appendix B when confronted with the question
whether to consolidate cases for purposes of adjudication.

VI. CONCLUSION
Complex litigation sometimes does seem to resemble Wonderland, but consolidation pursuant to Federal Rule 42 presents many more challenges than Wonderland's Rule 42. This
Article has tried to demonstrate that the ALI Complex Litigation Project contains important insights on the proper use of
consolidation while also criticizing the Project's unwillingness
to tighten up the test for consolidation. Given the limited probability that Congress will soon undertake the reforms the Project proposes to foster consolidation, we may hope that the
ALI's work in directly confronting the consolidation conundrum
will nevertheless serve to improve and focus the judiciary's use
of consolidation in the future.
To best flulfill that objective, however, the judiciary should
embrace the more forcehl provisions of Appendix B rather than
the open-textured directives of section 3.01. Whether judges
might do so is, a t best, uncertain. Not only does adherence to
Appendix B exalt the commentary over the black letter, it also
cuts against the judicial tendency to maximize the courts' discretion. This temptation to expand discretion may even lead to
relaxation of the provisions of Rule 23, from which this Article
has borrowed to fortify the Project's proposals. The Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules has for several years been considering changes in the class action rule that would make it more
~ ~ e n - t e x t u r e dIf. ~the
~ ' committee's class action initiatives her219. See supra note 119 (summarizing the differences in standard between

5 3.01, 5 5.01, and app. B of the Project).
220. For the text of one such proposal, and a critical analysis, see Robert G.
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ald a general trend to relax constraints on aggregation, the
prognosis for the Project as a device for confining and focusing
the use of consolidation is poor indeed. We may hope that another course will prevail with regard to both class actions and
consolidation.

Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79,
109-112(1994).

